So what kind of policy would Find-Ben-a-Boyfriend (FBaB) look like? That depends on the way the dating market is shaped and how government can best resolve the market failure involved.
Now, in the context of FBaB, let's take a look at one of those comments you always hear the girls say that will help shed some light on what the market looks like:
All the good guys are either taken or gay!
Well, it turns out that in my situation, all the good ones are either taken or straight. How ironic. In the end, both statements reflect the same thing: lack of good, available men. What does this mean in economic terms? Scarcity! The relatively low supply of good, available men (henceforth abbreviated to GAM) creates scarcity power in the hands of those who own the good, in this case the GAMs themselves. So what happens if supply power is concentrated in the hands of a few handsome, polite, nigh-perfect gentlemen?
Monopoly, silly! What else?
(Well, technically it's more of an oligopoly, but I'm not going to delve into the details of game theory here. Let's assume that GAMs function as a single unit and do not conspire against each other.)
Looking at the graph below, we can see that GAMs will date when the marginal cost (MC) of dating = the marginal revenue (MR) of dating. The price at which they will do so is at PM and the quantity of GAMs dating is at QM (this means that the GAMs to the right of QM are either full of themselves and choose not to date or that their marginal cost of dating is very high and perhaps unaffordable).
Note however that this means that the monopoly equilibrium point is not at the market equilibrium of Q* and P*. This means that there are some people who would date if the market were efficient but unfortunately cannot (i.e. Ben). This is represented by the shaded triangular region, where Ben is sadly situated.
What a travesty! Ben (and others) are effectively shut out of the market due to monopolistic control by GAMs. Now, invoking the spirit of American capitalism and free market competition, I believe that this suboptimal market outcome can be corrected with some clever government intervention in the form of FBaB. See the new graph below.
With FBaB, the government essentially subsidizes the GAMs to date at what would otherwise have been below their marginal cost. Their marginal cost curve shifts out from MCo to MC1 and the new dating equilibrium is at MC1=MR. Thus, price moves to P1=P* and quantity moves to Q1=Q*. The result of this expansion of dating means that the shaded region, previously an efficiency loss of people willing but unable to date, has been regained: Ben is now on the market! *wink* *wink*So, lets do a brief summation of the lessons learned today:
1. Monopoly is bad. A dating monopoly is even worse.
2. Public policy can correct monopoly distortions and restore efficient outcomes. FBaB, which takes on the form of a subsidy to GAMs to date more, results in the maximization of welfare.
3. FBaB benefits not just Ben, but all those who are in the shaded region with him. Thus, FBaB has a positive consumption externality. This just keeps sounding better and better!
Of course, the idea of subsidizing GAMs to date more does sound a little like pimping them out as a form of government love whores. But let's not think of it that way and envision FBaB as providing a little incentive for those high-maintenance GAMs to date more poor commonfolk such as myself by covering the cost of a dinner and a movie. It's not prostitution, it's eliminating financial barriers to potential happy couples!
Well what are you waiting for? Call your Congressperson and tell them to support FBaB!
8 comments:
I despise you and the fact that I read every single fucking word of your damn blog.
but how does the government find and classify GAMs? Will they go through rigorous psychological testing and then be equipped with some kind of ID or badge? Is it a voluntary program? Because if they ask people to step forth, wouldn't you get a lot of assholes that think they're GAMs (or pretend to be GAMs to get laid) stepping forward to collect welfare initiatives from the government that they will proceed to trick poor unsuspecting citizens with? I think that just as people have trouble finding one GAM for themselves, our incompetent government would never be able to find them all!
Well, when we talk about the market for GAMs pre-FBaB, there is no need for government identification because the market outcomes come about naturally (albeit inefficiently). The GAM monopoly is a natural monopoly.
Now, post-FBaB you make a good point, as it remains to be seen how GAMs can be distinguished from assholes. This makes a very good topic for my next update: adverse selection!
In the meantime, I offer these ideas as food for thought:
1. The presence of assholes is not likely to affect the market equilibrium at P1,Q1, but it will raise government expenditures. It the probability that a person is a GAM is say 50%, in other words, p(GAM)=.5, then the this will lead to a doubling of costs. Not all that great, but if you factor in the idea that the subsidy is really only a small amount of money in most cases, I'm quite sure the government can afford it.
2. Signaling, GAMs can give signals that show that they are indeed GAMs. As longs as benefits of using the signal is greater than the costs of obtaining it (and for non-GAMs, the cost is higher than the benefits) GAMs can make it known to the government (and me) that they are the real deal. More on this in a future post.
I agree with Jose. I feel like I just lost 2 minutes of my life reading your blog.
And I feel that prostituting out GAMs as you have proposed would most likely turn them into assholes, thus no longer GAMs. It's been my experience that if a guy KNOWS he's a GAM he's much more likely to go to the dark side.
And now that I've wasted even more time at work I'm going to reiterate my statement from my comment on your previous blog, you need to get a life and we are so going out this weekend so I don't have to read anymore blogs about FBaB. Economics really makes my head hurt.
Wait, signaling wouldn't work would it? If the government is pimping out these GAMs wouldn't the government be in charge of the marketing of these GAMs and so wouldn't the government be doing the signaling?
~Jose
I guess this would depend on how you see FBaB functioning.
One way of looking at it, which I'm thinking is how you viewed it, is that FBaB has a stock of GAMs to send on dates with yours truly, sort of like some federally-owned brothel. In that case, yes, the government would be the one to do the signaling to show that the guys it sends are indeed GAMs.
On the other hand, if FBaB functioned as a sort of reimbursement scheme that GAMs apply for post-date, then the signaling would be done by the GAMs themselves. This is how I envisioned FBaB, since the idea of the government stockpiling GAMs seems rather abhorrent, even to me.
I really have no idea what those graphs mean...but it seems that even theoretical market equations are against you. Poor Ben.
I made you a cookie... but I eated it.
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